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Perestroyka, introduced in the Soviet Union to  maximization does not lead to the exploitation of
reform the economy after the "period of stagna-  monopoly positions and inflation.
tion" under Brezhnev, involves combining
centrali7ed planning with elements of a market  Various macroeconomic conditions also
economy. For it to succeed, certain micro and  need to be fulfilled for perestroyka to succeed.
macro conditions need to be fulfilled.  The government should aim at realistic growth
rates, establish a balance between investmcnt
As far as micro conditions are concemed,  and consumption, climinate the ovcrhang in the
one should emphasize the interdependencc of  market.  for consumer goods and services, and
rational prices, decentralization, profit maximi-  drastically reduce the budget deficit.
zation, incentives, and competition.  For com-
modities produced domestically, the establish-  At the same time, the success or failurc of
ment of rational prices requires that prices  percstroyka will have implications for the
equate demand and supply. This, in tum, ncces-  success of reforms in the Europcan socialist
sitates the deccntralization of decision-making  countries. And the performance of these econo-
and profit maximization by the firm.  At the  mies wiU  be affected by the increased demand
same time, managcrs would have to be providcd  for quality in the Soviet Union.  But successful
with appropriatc incentives in order to ensure  reform cfforts on their part will help to mect this
that firms maximize profits.  Finally, there is  dcmand to exploit the opportunities offered by
need for competition to guarantce that profit  the vast Soviet market.
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This paper  provides  a critical  evaluation  of perestroyka
(rest-ucturing)  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  examines  its  implications  for  the
European  socialist  countries. Perestroyka  was introduced  to reform  the  Soviet
economy  after  the  "period  of stagnation"  under  Brezhnev. It involves
combining  centralized  planning  with  elements  of a  market  economy.
Section  I  of the  paper  describes  the  main  elements  of the  Soviet
economic  reforms. Sections  II  and  III,  respectively,  analyze  the  micro  and
the  macro  conditions  of the  success  of the  reforms. Section  IV  discusses  the
implications  of the  reforms  for  the  European  socialist  countries.
I.  The  Main  Elements  of Perestroyka
The basic  document  of perestroyka  is the  Osnovnye  polozheniia  (Basic
Provisions)  approved  by the  Central  Committee  Plenum  of the  Communist  Party  of
the  Soviet  Union  in  June 1987. This  was followed  by flrther  documents,  of
which  the  Law  on the  State  Enterprise,  enacted  in July  1987,  is  the  most
important.
The Basic  Provisions  emphasize  that  the  economy  will  continue  to be
centrally  planned  and  managed  as "a unified  economic  complex." Its  goals  and
priorities  are  set  by a fifteen  year  plan  that  serves  as  a basis  for  the
detailed  formulation  of the  plan  for  th'.  initial  five  year  period,  with  a
breakdown  by years. The  plan  is  prepared  by the  State  Planning  Committee
(COSPLAN)  and  divideu  among  the  ministries  that,  in turn,  provide  indicative-2-
planning  data  for  the  firms,  on the  basis  of wiiich  these  work  out their  own
five  year  ar.d  annual  plans.
The  ministries  have  been  subordinated  to seven  superministries.  At
teit  same  time,  sectoral  subbranches  of the  ministries  are  being  replaced  by
several  thousand  large  associations  and  enterprises,  established  by
amalgamating  existing  enterprises.  The  newly-created  large  groupings
incorporate  all  phases  of the  manufacturing  process,  from  research  to
production  to  marketing.
While  the  transfer  of the  functions  of the  subbranches  of the
ministries  reduce  their  operational  responsibilities,  the  ministries  continue
to  have  an important  role  in the  planning  process. Thus,  according  to the
Basic  Provisions,  the  ministry  "is  responsible  to the  nation  for  satisfying
demand  for  the  branch's  product,  preventing  disproportions,  ensuring  that  the
product  meets  world  technical  and  quality  standards,  and  working  out and
implementing  branch  scientific  and  technical  programs."
The  ministry  influences  firm  behavior  by setting
"1.  'Non-binding  control  figures'  that  specify  the  value  of output,  total
profits,  foreign  currency  receipts,  and 'major  indicators  of scientific
and  technical  progress  and qocial  development,'  a list  to be fixed  by the
Council  of Ministers.
2.  A mandatory  bill  of state  orders  for  output  that  includes
commissionings  of facilities  financed  by state  centralized  investment  and
products  essential  for  fulfilling  priority  state  tasks  for  'social
development,  scientific-technical  progress,  defence,  and  deliveries  of
farm  products.'
3.  Limits,  whidh  include  normatives  according  to  a list  approved  by the
Council  of Ministers,  regulating  such  matters  as growth  of total  wages  and
the  allocation  of profit  among  various  kinds  of taxes  and  funds"
(Schroeder,  1988,  pp.  56-57).
Apart  from  the  state  orders,  firms  are  to sell  their  products  freely
to  other  firms  and  to  wholesale  trade  organizations.  In turn,  aside  from-3-
basic  materials  and  investment  goods  that  continue  to  be rationed,  they  are  to
buy  their  materials  from  other  firms  and  from  wholesale  trade  organizations.
The firm's  plan is  based  on the  control  figures,  mandatory  state
orders,  economic  normatives,  and  contracts  with  customers  and suppliers.  The
Law on  the  State  Enterprise  states  that  "the  enterprise  is  obligated  to
strictly  observe  plan  discipline  and  meet  plans  and  contractual  obligations  in
full." It further  states  that  "fulfilment  of orders  and  contracts  serves  as
the  most  important  criterion  for  evaluating  the  activities  of the  enterprise
and  providing  material  rewards  for  its  employees  ,
The  firm  is  subject  to  "full  economic  accountability  and  self-
finance." This  means  that  the  firm  will  not  receive  subsidies  and  it  will
finance  all  its  current  and  capital  expenditures  from  its  sales  revenues.
Firms  that  continually  make  losses  are  to be liquidated.
The  Basic  Provisions  also  modify  the  process  of price  formation. For
basic  products,  prices  are  set  centrally  on the  basis  of "socially  necessary
expenses of production and sale, utility, quality, and effective demand," for
a period of five years.  They are to cover the costs of the enterprises,
including payments for natural resources, labor,  and capital.  For the
remaining products, contract prices are to be determined by the enterprises.
But these prices are subject to control and should be set on the same basis as
the centrally  determined prices.
Producer prices and consumer prices continue to be divorced from each
other.  Food prices are maintained low by the use of state subsidies which may
amount to as much as two-thirds of the producer price.  In turn, industrial
products are often subject to high t&xes.- 4 -
Under  perestroyka,  foreign  trade  has  been  decentralized.  By 1989,
all  enterprises  producing  competitive  products  can  trade  directly  with foreign
firms. However,  the  prices  received  and  paid  by Soviet  enterprises  are
divorced  from  world  market  prices  by the  use  of conversion  factors  that  vary
among  products. Also,  exceptions  from  direct  trading  by  enterprises  include
petroleum,  raw  materials,  steel  products,  chemicals,  grains,  and  food
products. Also,  while  exporters  are  supposed  to use  part  of their  foreign
exchange  earnings  to  import  materials  and  machinery,  in practice  imports
continue  to  be subject  to  controls.
The  Basic  Provisions  and  the  Law  of the  State  Enterprise  do not
specifically  concern  agriculture.  Agricultural  reform  was  to be carried  out
in  the  framework  of two  major  decrees. The  first,  adopted  in  November  1985,
established  GOSAPROM,  a superministry  for  agriculture  that  has subsequently
been  abolished  because  of the  excessive  bureaucracy  it created. The  second
decree,  adopted  in  March  1986,  permits  state  and  collective  farms  to sell  a
larger  proportion  of their  output  at  market  prices  and  endorses  the  use  of
production  contracts,
In  August  1988,  it  was  stated  that  individual  farmers  can  lease  land
up to  fifty  years  from  state  and  collective  farms. Furthermore,  in  August
1989,  it  was  declared  that  state  and  collective  farms  can sell  above-plan
output  for  foreign  exchange.
The law  adopted  by the  Supreme  Soviet  in  November  1986  stated  the
conditions  under  which  co-operatives  can  be  established.  The law  provides
possibilities  for  the  establishment  of co-operatives  in  a variety  of areas  but
permits  state  employees  to  participate  in the  operation  of co-operatives  only
outside  working  hours.-5-
II.  The  Micro-Conditions  for  the  Success  of Perestroyka
For  perestroyka  to succeed,  certain  micro-conditons  would  need  to  be
fulfilled.  In this  connection,  one  should  emphasize  the  interdependence  of
rational  prices,  decentralization,  profit  maximization,  incentives,  and
competition.  For  commodities  produced  domestically,  the  establishment  of
rational  prices  requires  that  prices  equate  demand  and supply. This,  in turn,
necessitates  the  decentralizatiQn  of  decision-making  and  profit  maximization
by the  firm. At the  same  time,  managers  would  have to  be provided  with
appropriate  incentives  in  order  to ensure  that  firms  maximize  profits.
Finally,  there  is  need for  competition  to guarantee  that  profit  maximization
does  not  lead  to the  exploitation  of  monopoly  positions  and inflation.
1.  The  Establishment  of Ratio)nal  Prices
The  price  reform,  originally  planned  for  1988,  has  been  stponed.
The implications  of  maintaining  existing  distorted  prices  have  been  well-
stated  by  Hewett: "That  gives  enterprises  several  years  to operate  with
distorted  prices  that  will  arbitrarily  give  profits  to some  enterprises  and
losses  to  others. That,  in  turn,  gives  enterprise  directors  ample  ammunition
to  argue  for  exceptions  (special  subsidies  or tax  breaks),  which  could  set  the
tone  for  the  next  decade  or so."  (1988,  p. 356).
But  the  planned  price  reforms  do not  provide  a solution  either.
Controlled  prices  will  be set  on the  basis  of  average  costs,  so that  they  will
not  equate  supply  and  demand,  and  they  will  remain  unchanged  for  five  years,
thereby  imparting  rigidity  to the  pricing  system. Nor  will  contractual  prices
equate  supply  and  demand  since  they  are  also  supposed  to  be set  on the  basis
of production  costs.At the  same  time,  to the  extent  that  enterprises  set  prices,  there
appears  to be  a tendency  for  price  increases. Existing  regulations  permit
raising  prices  by 15 percent  for  new  or particularly  fashionable  products.
But,  "new"  proc"icts  may represent  little  modification  from  "old"  products.
And,  the  existing  situation  of excess  demand,  together  with
monopolistic  structures  to  be discussed  below,  have  led  to increases  in  the
prices  of "old"  products  as well. This  explains  the  introduction  of price
controls  in  1989  (Financial  Times,  February  4, 1969). Price  controls,  then,
introduce  additional  rigidities  in  the  price  setting  process.
At the  same  time,  as noted  above,  prices  at the  consumer  level  are
divorced  from  prices  at the  producer  level  by the  use  of taxes  and
subsidies.  Yet,  the  two  sets  of prices  should  be linked  in  order  for  consumer
demand  to  influence  producer  decisions. This  would  necessitate  equalizing
rates  of  turnover  taxes  across  the  board  and  eliminating  consumer  subsidies.
Also,  prices  on the  producer  level  would  have to  be determined  on the
market. This,  in turn,  requires  that  the  other  micro  conditions  be
fulfilled.  These  will  be discussed  in  the  following.
2.  Decentralization
The  reform  leaves  the  central  planning  apparatus  and  the  ministries
in place. In  fact,  the  establishment  of the  superministries  represents
centralization  rather  than  decentralization.  As  Hewett  noted,  "these
supraministerial  organs  will  eventually  assume  important  planning  functions
for  their  complexes,  as Gosplan  takes  on the  more  general  role  of focusing  on
the  entire  economy,  which  includes  coordinating  relations  among  the
complexes.  Presumably  this  will  involve  constructing  .alances  for  the  key-7-
products  in  the  complex,  allocating  investment,  reorganizing  the  sector,  and
so on" (1988,  p. 338).
At the  same  time,  ministries  continue  to be judged  on the  basis  of
meeting  output  targets. Thus,  at a  meeting  of the  Council  of Ministers,  held
in January  1989,  "a string  of senior  ministers  ...  were  publicly  reprimanded
for  failing  to supply  consumer  goods  up to the  state-planned  targets"
tFinancial  Times,  January  16,  1989). With the  ministries  being  held
responsible  for  fulfilling  the  output  plan,  it is  hardly  surprising  that  they
try  to  hold  enterprises  to their  output  plan. Thus,  Gregory  may  not  greatly
exaggerate  in  making  the  following  statement.
"Ministries  are  still  judged  on the  basis  of  aggregated  physical  outputs
in the  same  detail  as before. Unless  perestroika  alters  in  a fundamental
way  the  manner  in  which  ministries  are judged,  it is  foolish  to expect  a
fundamental  change  in  ministry  dealings  with  the  enterprises.  The
ministry  will  wish  to  maintain  traditional  levers  over  its  enterprises.
Ministry  officials  note  that  if  they  are  to  continue  to  have  compulsory
targets,  they  must  continue  to assign  compulsory  targets  to their
enterprises"  (Gregory,  1989,  p. 6).
The  ministries  can influence  enterprise  actions  by  making  the  "non-
binding control figures" binding, by relying on s! ce orders, and by setting
the normativ!es  for the enterprise.  Particular importance attaches to state
orders that are based on the plan.  In effect, the state guarantees markets
and supplies.  At the same time, operating outside the state-order  network is
risky.  While buyers are easy to find, it is very difficult to obtain
materials for production that is not covered by state orders.
Normatives cover the share of profits going to the state, the
ministry, and the enterprise; the size of the wage fund; and charges for
working  capital,  the  use  of natural  resources  etc.  As normatives  are set
separately  for  each  enterprise,  the  ministries  can  use  them  to  ensureconforming  behavior  by the  enterprise.  They  are  also  subject  to bargaining  in
a si.uation  where  distorted  prices  affect  the  financial  profitability  of the
enterprise.
In order  to avoid  these  adverse  consequences,  price  determination  on
the  market  would  have  to be accompanied  by the  abolition  of the  rontrol
figures  and  the  equalization  of  normatives  across  enterprises. To the  extent
that  initial  conditions  differ  among  firms,  this  should  be taken  into  account
in  the  valuation  of their  capital.
Also,  state  orders  should  be reduced  to  a minimum. This,  in turn,
requires  abolishing  the  responsibility  of the  ministries  for  output  targets.
Output  should  be determined  on the  market  as firms  seek  to cater  to demand  in
the  pursuit  of profits.
3.  Profit  Maximization
In the  Soviet  Union,  profits  were introduced  alongside  with  output  as
firm  targets  during  the  Kosygin  reforms. Nevertheless,  output  remained  as the
principal  indicator  of tne  firm's  success.
Profitability  would  play  an important  role  under  the  reform  since
continuing  losses  would  bring  the  firm  into  bankruptcy.  However,  as noted
above,  under  distorted  prices,  profitability  indicators  ari also  distorted.
This,  in  turn,  gives  rise  to  bargaining  with  the  supervising  ministries.
At the  same  time,  for  the  supervising  ministries,  output  remains  the
main success  indicator.  This  means  that  the  ministries  will  want to force
firms  to  meet  output  targets. The  firms  will  be inclined  to  do so in  order  to
get  favorable  treatment  from  the  supervising  ministry, Such  will  not  be the
case  if  the  ministries  do not  have  output  targets  as suggested  above.-9-
4.  Incentives
In the  past,  managers'  bonuses  depended  on firm  plan  fulfillment  and
oni  various  indicators  set  by the  supervising  ministry. This  situation  hardly
changes  under  the  reform,  thereby  reducing  the  interest  of the  managers  in
maximizing  profits. In  order  to  do so,  managers  should  be given  a share  in
profits.
Profit  sharing  should  not  be instituted,  however,  for  the  workers
since  profits  are the  result  of actions  taken  by  managers  rather  than  the
workers. At the  same  time,  it  would  be desirable  to  generalize  the  piece  wage
system,  under  which  the  workers  are  remunerated  for  their  contribution  to the
firm's  production.
5.  Competition
In the  traditional  centrally  planned  system,  there  is  no competition
as the  transfer  of products  is  regulated  by the  plan. The introduction  of
firm-to-firm  relacions  could  ideally  give  rise  to  competition.  This is  not
the  case  in the  Soviet  Union,  however.
To begin  with,  there  is  no competition  from  imports. Also,  the
establishment  of a few  thousand  vertically  integrated  enterprises  gives  rise
to  monopoly  positions.  At the  same  time,  conditions  for  entry  are  controlled
by the  ministries.  And,  on the  part  of the  ministries,  no encouragement  is
given  to enterprises  to produce  outside  their  allotted  product  composition.
The lack  of competition  interferes  with the  efficiency  of resource
allocation  even  if  all  other  conditions  are  fulfilled. Furthermore,
inflationary  pressures  are  generated. It  has  been  reported  that  "a poll
conducted  in  late  1988  among  managers  of industrial  enterprises  revealed  that
10 percent  intend  to  reduce  output  by 15-20  percent  and raise  their  prices- 10  -
even more, so that output measured in current prices will increase
nevertheless" (Popov, 1989, p. 6).
Nor can one expect competition by the co-operatives.  This is because
the co-operatives produce services  and, to a lesser extent, consumer goods
which are not available or are not available in sufficient quantities.  At the
same time, after their initial,  successes, the activities of the co-operatives
have been ci.cumscribed, price control has been imposed, and taxes on income
derived from co-operatives raised.
The strictest rules have been imposed  on the flourishing  medical co-
operatives.  A range of medical activities, such as observation and treatment
of pregnancy, surgery, the treatment of infectious diseases, and the treatment
of drug addiction, have bee. banned and any other medical aid can be offered
only on the basis of a contract  with a medical institution.  The decree also
bans co-operative schools, the production or the hiring of video films,
publishing books on science, art, and literature, and the manufacture and sale
of religious items.  In addition, a whole range of activitie-, including  all
other publishing, organizing concerts, artistic events, and other forms of
entertainment, and tourism services will only be allowed if the co-operative
has a contract with a state enterprise (Financial  Times, January 6 and 17,
1989).
Also, price controls have been imposed on the co-operatives.  In the
event that cheap state supplies  are used, co-operatives are not supposed to
charge more than state prices.  Also, in response to high charges in co-
operative restaurants and cafes, local councils will set maximum mark-ups
(Financial  Times, February  4, 1989).- 11  -
Finally, income tax rates have been raised to a considerable extent
from the earlier level of 13 percent.  The highest marginal rate has been set
at 50 percent.  This will apply to a large extent to incomes  derived from co-
operative  activities.
These considerations indicate a lackadasical attitude on the part of
the government vis-*-vis the co-operatives.  While some economists projected
that the co-operatives may eventually provide 10-15 percent of national
income,  the success of the co-operatives and the high incomes they have
obtained has been greeted with dismay.  Thus, it is doubtful that the
contribution of the co-operatives will increase  much further.
Yet, for perestroyka to be successful,  more freedom would need to be
given to the co-operatives and their activities be extended to a wide range of
manufacturing products.  It would further be necessary to reverse the process
of industrial  concentration and to establish the conditions of genuine
competition.
III.  The Macro-Conditions for the Success of Perestroyka
For perestroyka to succeed, certain macro-conditions  would also need
to be fulfilled.  The government should aim at realistic  growth rates,
establish a balance between investment and consumption,  eliminate the overhang
in the market for consumer goods and services, and drastically reduce the
budget deficit.  These conditions will be discussed in the following.
1.  Setting  Realistic Growth Rates
Gorbachev's new economic strategy is said to be summed up in the new
political concepts of "uskorenie" (acceleration),  "perestroyka"
(restructuring),  and "glasnost" (openness).  In fact, the twelfth five year
plan for the period 1986-90  aims at a considerable acceleration of economic- 12 -
growth. For  the  period  as a whole,  GDP is  projected  to  rise  by 22 percent,
compared  with 16.5  percent  in 1981-85. A substantial  part  of  this  increase
would  be  accomplished  by the  rise in  efficiency  by !5  percent,  compared  with
7.5  percent  in  the  preceding  period  (Aganbegyan,  1988,  pp.  1, 10).
These  projections  are  not  realistic. As we have  seen,  the  economic
reform  has  not  progressed  far,  so  that  there  is  no basis  for  the  projected
improvement  in efficiency.  In fact,  the  dislocations  created  by the  reform
efforts  and  their  lack  of consistency  have  led  to a slowdown  in efficiency
improvements.  Thus,  in  the  short  run,  there  is  a conflict  between  "uskorenie"
and  "perestroyka."
If improvements  in  efficiency  slow  down,  increases  in  output  would  to
a  large  extent  be accomplished  through  increases  in  resources. Resource
availabilities  will,  however,  increase  to  a lesser  extent  than  beforehand,
because  of the  deceleration  of the  growth  of the  labor  supply  and the  limited
availability  of  natural  resources. According  to the  Five  Year Plan,  resources
would  increase  by 7 percent  in 1986-90,  compared  with  9 percent  in 1981-85
(Ibid).
This  being  the  case,  aiming  at high  economic  growth  rates  only
exacerbates  the  excess  demand  prevalent  in the  Soviet  economy. Excess  demand,
in turn,  creates  disproportions  among  industries,  adds  to inflationary
pressure,  and  does  not  permit  the  market  mechanism  to  operate  satisfactorily.
There  is  need,  therefpre,  to eliminate  the  excess  demand  existing  in
the  economy. Apart  from  reducing  the  budget  deficit  and  eliminating  the
overhang  in  the  market  for  consumer  goods,  to  be discussed  below,  this  will
necessitate  avoiding  excessive  plan  targets  and  reforming  the  credit  system.
In recent  years,  credit  provided  for  enterprises  increased  much  more
rapidly  than  production.  According  to  Aganbegyan,  in some  years  the  volume  of- 13  -
credit  increased  by 15-17  percent  while  output  grew  by 3-5  percent  (1988,  p.
138). At the  same  time,  the  repayment  of credit  was  not  ensured,  thereby
adding  to  the  liquidity  of the  enterprises.  There  is  need  to  develop  a new
credit  policy  that  avoids  creating  excess  liquidity  and  provides  for  the
repayment  of credit.
2.  Establishing  a  Balance  between  Investment  and  Consumption
Perestroyka  created  considerable  expectations  for  improvements  in
living  standards.  This  has  not  occurred. The  lines  have lengthened  before
shops  that  appear  to  have less  merchandise.  Rationing  has  become  more
widespread,  and  in  August  1989  limitations  were imposed  on the  purchase  of a
range  of  consumer  goods  by non-residents  in  Moscow.
The  statistical  results  of the  first  half  of 1989  confirm  these
tendencies.  Retail  sales  of bread,  potatoes,  vegetables,  fish,  and  sugar
declined  and  no change  occurred  in  the  production  of meat  and  butter. Also,
the  production  of many  consumer  durables,  such  as cars,  motorcycles  and  sewing
machines,  fell  (Wall  Street  Journal,  August  30,  1989).
Part  of the  problem  lies  in the  relative  neglect  of  consumption  in
the  1986-90  Five  Year  Plan.  According  to the  plan,  the  capital  stock  would
increase  by 30 percent  in the  1986-90  period  as  against  a rise  of 17  percent
in 1981-85  (Aganbegyan,  1988,  p. 10). Hewett  notes  that  "available  data  do
not indicate  precisely  where  the sacrifices  are  to  be made,  but  probable
targets  are  housing,  the  construction  industry,  and  a  broad  category  of
'other'  in  which  most social  infrastructure  investment  can  be found"  (1988,
p. 317). Thus,  the  welfare  consequences  of the  large  investments  extend
beyond  food.- 14 -
Much of the new investment  would go into machine building.  According
to Aganbegyan "in the Soviet machine buiiding sector in the 1981-85 period
only 9 percent of all equipment was renewed,  while in the 1986-90 period 40
percent will be changed.  This will mean a rise in the annual rate of planned
renewal  of the range of machinery produced from 3.1 percent in 1985 to 13
percent in 1990" (1988, p. 14).
The renewal of machinery is in fact an important objective,
especially since Soviet machinery is  much outdated compared with the West.
But it is not sufficient to install modern machinery.  In this connection, one
may recall the example of Poland that spent large sums on modern machinery in
the 1970s  without commensurate results.
In the Polish case, the lack of a thoroughgoing economic reform was
responsible for the lack of success of the machine building effort.  Similar
problems arise in the Soviet Union where an appropriate incentive system is
lacking.  Without such a system, the efficient utilization of machinery cannot
be ensured.
These considerations indicate the desirability of a slowdown in the
investment  effort; since 1988 some steps have been taken in this direction but
one would have much farther to go.  This conclusion is strengthened if we
consider the need to provide for consumer demand in -he  age of glasnost, when
the deficiencies of the supply system are widely publicized.  In fact, the
dissatisfaction of the population threatens the success of perestroyka.
The first consideration is to provide sufficient food for the
population.  There were great expectations about the possibilities opened by
the August 1988 decree that permitted the leasing of land to individual
farmers up to 50 years.  The Washington Post cited the Soviet news agency that- 15  -
foresaw  "a new  wave  of the  mass  transfer  of land  and other  means  of production
to leaseholders  in the  autumn  and  winter  period  of preparations  for  the  new
agricultural  season"  (August  27, 1988).
These  expectations  have  not  been  realized  and  there  has  been  little
movement  to lease  land. Various  considerations  may explain  this  outcome. To
begin  with,  there  hds  been  opposition  on the  part  of sovhozes,  kolkhozes,  and
the  local  authorities. Furthermore,  agricultural  machinery  and  materials  have
not  been  provided  and  the  available  machinery  does  not  fit  the  needs  of the
smallholders.  Last  but  not least,  the  experience  of the  1930s  and  more  recent
reversals  in the  case  of co-operatives  have raised  questions  about  the  long-
term  future  of this  effort.
Yet,  the  long  term  leases  deserve  the  full  support  of the  government
since  they  promise  improvements  in  productivity.  Further  productivity
improvements  may  be obtained  by  dividing  the  kolkhozes  into  smaller  units  and
transforming the sovhozes into profit-making enterprises.  At the same time,
there is need to improve infrastructure, in particular the storing,
processing, and transportation of food.
Satisfying the needs of the population would further require
increased imports of consumer goods.  This issue will be taken up below in
connection  with the need to eliminate the overhang in the market for consumer
goods and services.
3.  Eliminating  the  Overhang  in the  Market  for  Consumer  Goods  and  Ser-ices
Limitations on the availability of goods and services led to the
accumulation  of fiancial  savings  in  the  Soviet  Union. Thus,  financial  savings
as a ratio  of retail  sales  increased  from  0.54  in 1978  to  C.81  in 1988
(PlanEcon Report, February 17, 1989).- 16  -
This large  amount  of  accumulated  savings  represents  an overhang  in
the  consumer  markst  that  is  an inflationary  forc'. In order  to  establish
equilibrium  in the  market,  it  would  be  desirable  to eliminate  the  overhang.
Several  measures  may be taken  to pursue  this  objective.
First  of all,  it  would  be  desirable  to increase  the  attractiveness  of
financial  savings. This  could  be accomplished  by raising  interest  rates  on
savings  deposits  and  issuing  bonds  at attractive  interest  rates. Interest
rates  have  remained  unchanged  at low  levels  in  recent  years  despite  increases
in  the  underlying  rate  of inflation.
Second,  it  would  be  desirable  to raise  the  prices  of luxury  and  semi-
luxury  goods  that  are  in short  supply. The  approximately  eight  year  waiting
period  for  automobiles  could  be reduced  if prices  were increased  to  levels
where  excess  demand  declines. Also,  the  prices  of electronic  goods  could  be
raised.
Third,  reductions  in  military  spending  would  providp  the  opportunity
to increase  the  production  of  automobiles  and electronic  goods. A shift  from
the  production  of military  vehicles  to that  of  automobiles  could  be
accomplished  relatively  easily  and  military  electronic  goods  could  also  be
transformed  into  civiliaa  goods.
Fourth,  a substantial  part  of housing  construction  may  be oriented
towards  the  sale  of houses  and  apartments  to private  individuals.  This should
involve  the  payment  of advanced  deposits  that  may  also  be used  for  the  sale  of
automobiles.
Fifth,  the  population  should  be provided  with increasing  options  for
investment.  This  would  permit  channeling  some  of the  financial  savings  into
investment  goods.- 17  -
Sixth,  the imports  of consumer  goods  should  be stepped  up.  Imports
should  concentrate  on products  that  have  a high  domestic  mark-up,  such  as
electronic  goods. This  may  make  it possible  to  obtain  8-10  roubles  per
dollar.
Increased  imports  of consumer  goods  would  involve  external
borrowing. This  is  made  possible  by the  relatively  low  foreign  indebtedness
of the  Soviet  Union. The  New  York  Times  reports  that  at the  end  of 1988  the
Soviet  Union  had  an  external  debt  of $43  billion,  against  which  one should  set
deposits  with  Western  banks  of $28  billion  and  other  foreign  assets  of $5
billion  (July  31, 1989). The  same  issue  of the  New  York  Times  quotas  George
Clark,  the  Executive  Vice  President  of Citybank,  according  to  whom  "the Soviet
Union  could  double  its  foreign  debt  today  without  raising  any  kind  of
concern." This  would,  however,  necessitate  the  prompt  servicing  of the  debt,
the  lack  of  which  can  adversely  affect  borrowing  possibilities.
4.  Reducing  the  Budget  Deficit
For  many  years,  the  Soviet  Union  reported  a balanced  government
budget. With  glasnost,  it  has  been  made public  that  the  Soviet  Union  has been
incurring  increasing  budget  deficits. The  reported  budget  deficit  averaged  20
billion  rubles  in 1980-85,  55 billion  rubles  in 1986,  and  95 billion  rubles  in
1987  (The  Economist,  October  8, 1988). In August  1989,  the  Chairman  of
GOSPLAN  reported  that  the  projected  1989  budget  deficit  has  grown  20 percent
in  six  months  to 120  billion  rubles  or 13.8  percent  of the  gross  domestic
product.
The rising  budget  deficit  reflects  rapid  increases  in  current  and
capital  expenditures  and  in subsidies,  accompanied  by  little  if  any  rise in
revenues. A large  item  in current  expenditure  has  been  the  acceleration  of- 18  -
wage increases,  rising  by 7 percent  irn  1988,  compared  with  a plan  target  of 2
percent  (Financial  Times,  January  23,  1989)  with  a further  increase  of 9
percent  in the  first  quarter  of 1989,  compared  with  a plan  target  of 1  percent
for the  entire  year  (PlanEcon  Report,  Anril  28, 1989). Capital  expenditures
reflect  the  expansion  of investment  under  the 1986-90  plan. And, subsidies
have  risen  both  to finance  the  increasing  losses  of enterprises  and  to  keep
down  food  prices  in the  face  of higher  prices  paid  for  agricultural  produce.
Finally,  there  have  been  unanticipated  expenditures  in  connection  with
Chernobyl  and  the  Armenian  earthquake.
On the  revenue  side  an important  negative  item  has  been the  reduced
revenue  from  taxes  on  alcohol,  in  conjunction  with  Gorbachev's  anti-alcohol
compaign. According  to  PlanEcon  Report,  official  sales  of alcohol  declined  by
11.6  percent  in 1985,  10.6  percent  in 1986,  and  0.5  percent  in 1987  (February
17,  1989). Also,  revenues  fell  as  a result  of decreases  in  oil  prices  and the
decline of profit remittances by the enterprises.
A  variety of measures may be taken to reduce the budget deficit.
These include price increases for luxuries and semi-luxuries,  advance deposits
on houses, apartments, and automobiles, and the sale of imported consumer
goods at high prices, recommended for eliminating the overhang in consumer
markets.
Furthermore, current expenditures could be reduced by limiting
subsidies to loss-making enterprises, lowering food subsidies, restraining
wage increases, reducing the size of the bureaucracy, and cutting military
expenditures.  In turn, the investment program should be cut by postponing
large projects.- 19  -
A leading candidate for cuts is the large petrochemical  complex in
Tiumen (Western  Siberia).  The planned investment itl  petroleum in Tanguin may
also be postponed.  Other candidates for cuts include investments in the
production of fertilizers, in irrigation as well as the proposed metros in
several cities.
The government may also introduce  auctions of foreign exchange.
Apart from increasing revenues, such auctions would contribute to the better
allocation of foreign exchange and represent a first step toward3 the
convertibility of the ruble.
IV.  The Implications of Perestroyka for the European Socialist Countries
The success or failure of perestroyka  will have an influence on
economic reforms in the European socialist countries.  Success will support
the reform efforts oL countries, such as Hungary and Poland, that have
embarked on economic reforms, and may pi v de inducements to reforms in
countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria.  In turn, as Rezs8 Nyers, the
President of the Hungarian Socialist  Workers' Party, expressed it, "East
European reforms will be influenced by setbacks of Soviet reform. ...  A
setback  will have a limiting impact.  It will warn everybody to be more
cautious" (New York Times, January 5, 1988).
If perestroyka goes ahead, however imperfectly,  it will have an
influence  on Soviet foreign trade.  It is planned to increase the share of
trade in national income, concentrating on raising  manufactured exports while
stabilizing the exports of fuels and raw materials (Ivanov, 1988, pp. 147-48).
But the expansion of Soviet trade would occur largely with the
convertible currency area.  Any increases in fuel and raw material exports
will be sold for dollars.  At the same time, there will be a tendency to shift- 20  -
purchases  of  manufactured  goods  from  the  CMEA  countries  to the  convertible
currency  area  where  higher  quality  goods  can  be obtained. And,  much  of the
expansion  of imports  will  occur  in high  technology  products  that  are largely
provided  by the  convertible  currency  area.
The  European  socialist  countries  will  also  suffer  a deterioration  of
their  terms  of trade. The  Soviet  Union  will  aim  to obtain  world  market  prices
for  its  fuels  and  raw  materials  and  to pay  prices  for  manufactured  goods  that
correspond  to :heir  quality.
On the  other  hand,  the  European  socialist  countries  will  benefit  from
g-.eater  freedom  in trade  flows. State-to-state  contracts  will increasingly
give  place  to trade  relations  among  enterprises  that  will  reduce  the  existing
rigidity  of trade  patterrs.
Last  but  not  least,  the  European  socialist  countries  will  have  access
to the  large  and  growing  market  of the  Soviet  Union. But,  in order  tc  exploit
the  possibilities  offered  by the  vast  market,  the  quality  of goods  needs  to be
improved  and  product  composition  upgraded. This,  in turn,  requires  far-
reaching  economic  reforms  in  the  European  socialist  countries.
V.  Conclusions
This paper  has  provided  a critical  evaluation  of perestroyka  and
noted  its  implications  for the  European  socialist  countries. After  describing
the  main  elements  of the  Soviet  economic  reforms,  the  paper  indicated  the
micro-  and  macro-conditions  for  the  success  of tbe  reforms.
As far  as micro-conditions  are  concerned,  emphasis  has  been  given  to
the interdependence  of rational  prices,  decentralization,  profit  maximization,
incentives,  and  competition. For  commodities  that  are  produced  domestically,
the  establishment  of rational  prices  requires  that  prices  equate  demand  and- 21  -
supply. This,  in  turn,  necessitates  the  decentralization  of decision  making
and  profit  maximization  by the  firm. At the  same  time,  managers  would  have  to
be provided  with  appropriate  incentives  in  order  to ensure  that  firms  maximize
profits. Finally,  there  is  need for  competition  to guarantee  that  profit
maximization  does  not  lead  to the  exploitation  of  monopoly  positions  and  to
inflation.
For  perestroyka  to succeed,  certain  macro-conditons  would  also  need
to be fulfilled.  The  government  should  aim  at realistic  growth  rates,
establish  a balance  between  investment  and  consumption,  eliminate  the  overhang
in the  market  for  consumer  goods  and  services,  and  drastically  reduce  the
budget  deficit.
The  discussion  of the  micro-  and  macro-conditions  for  the  success  of
perestroyka  indicated  that  the  measures  taken  have  not  gone  very  far  and  have
been  characterized  by lack  of consistency.  Much  needs  to be  done,  therefore,
for  perestroyka  to  be implemented  in  practice.
In 1989,  some  steps  were taken  towards  the  fulfilment  of the  macro-
conditions  in the  framework  of  a stabilization  program  (Hewett,  1989)  but
these  do  not  go very  far.  In  April  1990,  new  reform  measures  have  been
announced  to further  the  establishment  of  market  conditions  but  their
implementation  is  subject  to considerable  opposition.
At the  same  time,  the  success  or failure  of peretroyka  will  have
implications  for  the  success  of reforms  in the  European  socialist  countries.
And,  the  performance  of these  economies  will  be  affected  by the  increased
demands  for  quality  by the  Soviet  Union. But,  successful  reform  efforts  on
their  part  will  help to  meet this  demand  and  to  exploit  the  opportunities
offered  by the  vast  Soviet  market.- 22  -
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